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Abstract
■ To investigate potentially dissociable recognition memory
responses in the hippocampus and perirhinal cortex, fMRI stud-
ies have often used confidence ratings as an index of memory
strength. Confidence ratings, although correlated with memory
strength, also reflect sources of variability, including task-irrelevant
item effects and differences both within and across individuals in
terms of applying decision criteria to separate weak from strong
memories. We presented words one, two, or four times at study
in each of two different conditions, focused and divided atten-
tion, and then conducted separate fMRI analyses of correct old re-
sponses on the basis of subjective confidence ratings or estimates
from single- versus dual-process recognition memory models.
Overall, the effect of focussing attention on spaced repetitions
at study manifested as enhanced recognition memory perfor-
mance. Confidence- versusmodel-based analyses revealed dispa-
rate patterns of hippocampal and perirhinal cortex activity at
both study and test and both within and across hemispheres.
The failure to observe equivalent patterns of activity indicates
that fMRI signals associated with subjective confidence ratings
reflect additional sources of variability. The results are consis-
tent with predictions of single-process models of recognition
memory. ■
INTRODUCTION
Two theories presently compete to provide a compelling
account of recognition memory effects. Single-process
theories derived from signal detection theory propose
that recognition memory represents the total strength of
evidence that a studied item is old (the unequal variance
signal detection [UVSD]model; Wixted, 2007; Donaldson,
1996). According to dual-process theories, recognitionmem-
ory depends on the products of two different processes—
retrieval of contextual information associated with a study
episode (“recollection”) and simply knowing that an item
has been encountered beforehand (“familiarity”) (e.g.,
Yonelinas, 2002; Mandler, 1980). These two processes
can be implemented as distinct sources of information
contributing to categorical or threshold-like decisions
(the “process-pure” or dual-process signal detection
(DPSD) approach; Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2010;
Yonelinas, 2002) or as sources of continuous information
to be combined into a single strength-of-evidence dimen-
sion (the dual-process UVSD account; e.g., Wixted, 2007;
Wixted & Stretch, 2004).
The process-pure DPSD account has often been used
to constrain the design of fMRI studies, presupposing
the validity of the approach (Wixted, 2009). Experimental
designs involving comparisons of high confidence “old” or
“remember” responses with correct rejections of new
items ormisses have been used to demonstrate “selective”
activation of the hippocampal formation attributable to rec-
ollection and show perirhinal cortex activation associated
with less confident or “know” responses attributable to
familiarity (e.g., Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007;
Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski,
Bookheimer, & Engel, 2000). However, proponents of the
dual-process version of the UVSD model consider high
confidence (and remember) decisions to reflect high pro-
portions of both recollection and familiarity and low con-
fidence (and know) decisions to reflect low proportions of
the same, interpreting them simply as strong and weak
memories, respectively. Thus, rather than identifying qual-
itatively different memory processes in the hippocampus
and perirhinal cortex, these earlier studies are viewed as
involving a memory strength confound—a criticism equally
applicable from the perspective of the single-process UVSD
account (e.g., Wais, Squire, &Wixted, 2010; Squire, Wixted,
&Clark, 2007; see alsoGonsalves, Kahn, Curran,Norman, &
Wagner, 2005).
An alternative design adopted by DPSD theorists in
fMRI studies involves comparisons of either associative
or source memory and item memory decisions. Success-
fully identifying an item as old and correctly identifying
the source or associate is often attributed to recollection,
whereas successful retrieval of item information alone is
attributed to familiarity, although an alternative perspec-
tive attributes the latter to recollection of sometimes erro-
neous or irrelevant information (see Mitchell & Johnson,
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2009). Again, the principal finding has been one of selec-
tive activation of the hippocampus for the former process
(e.g., Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Mayes,
Montaldi, & Migo, 2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006). De-
spite matching their conditions in terms of correct old re-
sponses, few studies accounted for the potential memory
strength confound of confidence judgements being typi-
cally higher for old items that are accompanied by retrieval
of correct source/associate information (see Squire et al.,
2007). Recent studies attempting to control for memory
strength in these designs have yielded different results
with respect to familiarity signals in the hippocampus
and perirhinal cortex (e.g., Diana et al., 2010; Wais et al.,
2010; Kirwan,Wixted, & Squire, 2008; Staresina&Davachi,
2008).
Typically, the rationale given for using confidence rat-
ings as an index ofmemory strength is that they are related
to accuracy in old/new decisions, and it is often assumed
that such ratings are equally spaced and linearly related to
differences in memory strength (e.g., Rouder, Pratte, &
Morey, 2010; Mickes, Wixted, & Wais, 2007). Yet item rec-
ognition memory receiver operating characteristic curves
obtained with confidence ratings can differ from those
obtained with Remember-Know (RK) decisions, a find-
ing attributed to trial-to-trial variability in the application
of decision criteria within participants as well as variabil-
ity among participants (Malmberg & Xu, 2006; Rotello,
Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004; Wixted & Stretch, 2004).1 This
variability or decision noise inherent in separating strong
from weak memories can also influence the form of re-
ceiver operating characteristic curves, changing them from
U-shaped to inverted U-shaped (e.g., Malmberg & Xu,
2006; Malmberg, 2002; Ratcliff, McKoon, & Tindall, 1994).
Further, such variability may actually increase when par-
ticipants are instructed to evenly distribute or use all avail-
able ratings (e.g., Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005).
As Rouder et al. (2010) have noted, there may be no ob-
jective method for assessing the relative variability of
memory strength distributions on the basis of confidence
ratings. Comparisons of high and low confidence ratings
can also elicit medial-temporal lobe (MTL) activity for un-
studied (i.e., new) items in fMRI studies (Kirwan, Shrager,
& Squire, 2009).
Task-irrelevant item differences can also be confounded
with memory strength when participants are allowed to
self-select items via ratings or RK decisions. For example,
recognition memory strength for words is known to be
correlated with a range of lexical variables, such as fre-
quency, imageability, age of acquisition, neighborhood
size, and so forth, and it is known that these variables can
influence fMRI activity in the hippocampus (e.g., Freeman,
Heathcote, Chalmers, & Hockley, 2010; Diana & Reder,
2006; Fliessbach, Weis, Klaver, Elger, & Weber, 2006; de
Zubicaray, McMahon, Eastburn, Finnigan, & Humphreys,
2005a, 2005b; Malmberg, Holden, & Shiffrin, 2004). Thus,
as low-frequency words are better recognized than high-
frequency words, they aremore likely to be given high con-
fidence ratings, and high-frequency words are more likely
to be given low confidence ratings. Words of high image-
ability are more likely to be given high confidence ratings.
Any differences in fMRI signal, then, may also be a con-
sequence of frequency or imageability differences when
words are used as stimuli (e.g., Diana et al., 2010; Wais
et al., 2010; Uncapher & Rugg, 2008; Yonelinas et al., 2005;
Kensinger, Clarke, & Corkin, 2003). Given the sources of
variability introduced by confidence ratings, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that the method is less than optimal
for indexing memory strength.
An alternative to experimental designs that use subjec-
tively derived responses to index memory strength in-
volves manipulating memory strength signals directly in
terms of predefined independent variables. Tomanipulate
recognition memory strength in our fMRI experiment, we
incremented the number of item presentations at study in
two different conditions, focused and divided attention,
to permit comparisons of identical old responses (hits)
across conditions. Typically, item repetition at study strength-
ens memory representations, and divided attention pro-
duces an interference effect because of competition for
central resources that results in poorer memory perfor-
mance (Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000; Craik, Govoni,
Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Crowder, 1976).
The attentional resources devoted to the study of repeated
spaced items are about the same compared with the first
presentation because measures of secondary task perfor-
mance remain relatively stable across presentations (only
decreasing with massed repetitions, e.g., Johnston & Uhl,
1976; also Guez & Naveh-Benjamin, 2006).
Process-pure DPSD theorists consider divided attention
at study to reduce recollection to a greater extent than fa-
miliarity (Uncapher & Rugg, 2005, 2008; Eichenbaum et al.,
2007; Kensinger et al., 2003; Yonelinas, 2001, 2002). Pre-
vious fMRI studies conducted from a DPSD perspective
therefore contrasted correct old responses in focused
versus divided attention conditions at study, revealing in-
creased activity in the hippocampus during word encod-
ing that the authors collectively attributed to recollection
(e.g., Uncapher & Rugg, 2005, 2008; Kensinger et al., 2003).
Of note, one study in which participants self-selected stud-
ied items via RK decisions revealed posterior hippocampal
activity (Uncapher & Rugg, 2008; recollected vs. missed
items), whereas those comparing undifferentiated hits
across conditions reportedmore anterior hippocampal ac-
tivity (e.g., Uncapher & Rugg, 2005; Kensinger et al., 2003).
The results of the latter two investigations may also be in-
terpreted from aUVSDperspective as simply reflecting dif-
ferences inmemory strength between the study conditions.
The effect of item repetition is less clear-cut from the
DPSD model perspective. For example, behavioral evi-
dence indicates that repeating spaced items increases es-
timates of both recollection and familiarity, with a slightly
larger effect for the former process (for a review, see
Yonelinas, 2002). Yet DPSD proposals based around peri-
rhinal cortex and hippocampal neuronal responses view
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item repetition as having the opposite effect, influencing
familiarity to a greater extent than recollection (e.g.,
Eichenbaum et al., 2007, Table 1). The UVSD account in-
stead predicts monotonic, although not necessarily linear,
responses (e.g., Dunn, 2004, 2008; Squire et al., 2007;
Wixted, 2007; Wixted & Stretch, 2004).
In the present study, we investigated the effects of al-
lowing participants to self-select studied items via con-
fidence ratings on fMRI activity in the hippocampus and
perirhinal cortex, contrasting the effects with those ob-
tained from analyses informed by both UVSD and DPSD
model estimates. If the patterns of activity differ between
analysis types at study and test, then this can be consid-
ered evidence that previous attempts to dissociate famil-
iarity and recollection signals in the hippocampus and
perirhinal cortex likely reflect variability introduced by
the application of different decision criteria, item effects,
or other task-irrelevant confounds.
METHODS
Participants
Sixteen healthy, right-handed, native English-speaking vol-
unteers (8women) ofmean age 25.6 years (SD=7.0 years)
were recruited from the university community. All gave
written informed consent before participating in accor-
dance with the protocol approved by theMedical Research
Ethics Committee of the University of Queensland. They
were reimbursed for participating.
Materials
The critical stimuli comprised 240 high-frequency mono-
syllabic words, ranging in length from four to six letters.
These were assigned randomly to five study-test lists. Each
study list consisted of 24words, and each test list consisted
of the 24 studied items and 24 novel, unstudied words.
The practice stimuli comprised another 12 high-frequency
monosyllabic words ranging in length from four to five let-
ters (6 studied items and 6 novel items).
Procedure
Five study-test phases were conducted, each separated by
a brief (25-sec) retention interval. Instructions as to the
nature of each phase were given at the start of the block
with “learn” or “remember” appearing for 6 sec. Each study
phase consistedof 24wordspresented inuppercase 48-point
font in themiddle of the screen, one, two, or four times for
a total of 56 trials. Studywordswere presented for 3 sec fol-
lowed by a blank screen, with an SOA of 6 sec. Each word
was preceded by a central fixation cross for 0.5 sec, followed
by a blank screen for 0.5 sec. Participants were instructed
to remember the words for a subsequent memory test.
Study words were presented either in isolation as above
(focused attention condition) or as part of a divided atten-
tion task (adapted from Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). In
the divided attention task condition, a study word was pre-
sented concurrently with two flanking digits presented to
the left and right of the word for 250 msec. The two digits
were always different from each other and did not include
zero, with one digit being randomly small (font size =
40 points) and the other large (font size = 80 points). The
study word remained in view until the end of 3 sec after
which the question “size?” or “value?” appeared randomly,
requiring the participant to indicate which digit ( left or
right, respectively) was physically larger or had the greater
numerical value. Participants responded with a button
press to indicate their choice using their right hand.
Each test phase comprised the 24 studied words and
the 24 new (i.e., unstudied) words presented in pseudo-
random order. To minimize study-test repetition lag vari-
ability, all studied words were presented in the same third
of the test list as at study. Each test word was presented for
2.5 sec with an SOA of 6.5 sec. Participants were instructed
to withhold their response during this period (i.e., until
the word disappeared from the screen). Next the cate-
gories “certainly new,” “probably new,” “probably old,”
and “certainly old”were presented together, in a cross for-
mation around the center of the screen, for up to 2 sec.
This served as a prompt to respond and to indicate which
button should be pressed for a given response. Participants
responded by pressing one of four buttons corresponding
to their decision on a similarly arranged response pad
using their right hand. They were instructed to adopt re-
sponse criteria that enabled them to use each of the cate-
gories more or less equally. The selected label changed
color to red for 0.2 sec to provide response feedback,
and a blank screen was presented for the remainder of
the 2-sec period.
Before scanning, participants completed a brief practice
session comprising focused and divided attention study
and test phases (six studied items and six novel items). Par-
ticipants were given feedback concerning their accuracy at
the end of each phase.
Apparatus
A laptop PC running the Microsoft VisualBasic and the
ExacTicks (Ryle Design) software was used to deliver the
word stimuli and to record responses fromanMR-compatible
four-button response box. Stimuli were presented in black
on a luminous white background, enlarged and back-
projected using a BenQ SL705X projector onto a screen
that the participants viewed through a mirror mounted
on the head coil. The stimuli subtended approximately
10° of visual arc when each participant was positioned
for imaging.
fMRI Imaging
Participants were imaged with a Bruker Medspec sys-
tem operating at 4 T using a transverse electromagnetic
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head coil for radio-frequency transmission and reception
(Vaughan et al., 2002). A gradient-echo EPI sequence opti-
mized for both imagequality andnoise reduction (McMahon,
Pringle, Eastburn, & Maillet, 2004) was used to acquire
T2*-weighted images depicting BOLD contrast (64 × 64
matrix, 3.6 × 3.6-mm voxels). In each of five consecutive
fMRI sessions, 330 image volumes of 36 axial 3.5-mm slices
(0.1-mm gap) were acquired (repetition time = 2.1 sec,
echo time = 30 msec, flip angle = 90°), for a total of
1650 images. The first five volumes fromeach sessionwere
discarded. Head movement was limited by foam padding
within the head coil. A point-spread function (PSF) map-
ping sequence was acquired before the EPI time series ac-
quisitions to correct geometric distortions (Zaitsev, Hennig,
& Speck, 2003). A three-dimensional T1-weighted image
was acquired using a magnetization-prepared rapid acquisi-
tion gradient-echo sequence (2563 matrix, 0.9-mm3 voxels)
before the fourth fMRI session. Total imaging time was ap-
proximately 45 min.
fMRI Analysis
Image preprocessing and analysis were conducted with
statistical parametric mapping software (SPM8; Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Queen Square,
London). All volumes from the five study-test sessions
were resampled using generalized interpolation to the ac-
quisition of themiddle slice in time to correct for the inter-
leaved acquisition sequence, then realigned to the first
volume of the initial session using the INRIAlign toolbox
(Freire, Roche, & Mangin, 2002). A mean image was gen-
erated from the realigned series and coregistered to the
T1-weighted image. The T1-weighted image was subse-
quently segmented using the “New Segment” procedure
in SPM8. The “DARTEL” toolbox (Ashburner, 2007) was
then used to create a custom group template from the gray
and white matter images and individual flow fields that
were used to normalize the realigned fMRI volumes to the
MNI atlas T1 template. The resulting images were resampled
to 2-mm3 voxels and smoothed with an 8-mm FWHM iso-
tropic Gaussian kernel. Global signal effects were then es-
timated and removed using a voxel-level linear model
(Macey, Macey, Kumar, & Harper, 2004).
We conducted a two-stage, mixed effects model statis-
tical analysis. For both study and test phases, trial types
corresponding to correct old responses and misses were
defined for each of the divided and focused attention
conditions for each presentation (1, 2, or 4). Correct rejec-
tions and false alarms were also defined as trial types for
the test phase. These were modeled as effects of interest
with delta functions representing each onset, along with a
nuisance regressor consisting of response onsets, and con-
volved with a synthetic hemodynamic response function
and accompanying temporal and dispersion derivatives.
Standard high (1/128 Hz) and low-pass filtering with an
autoregressive (AR1)model were applied. Linear contrasts
were applied to each participantʼs parameter estimates
at the fixed effects level, for correct old responses in the
focused versus divided attention conditions for each pre-
sentation, then entered in a group-level repeated mea-
sures ANOVA in which covariance components were
estimated using a restricted maximum likelihood proce-
dure to correct for nonsphericity (Friston et al., 2002).
A priori ROIs for the hippocampus and the perirhinal
cortex were defined in each hemisphere as explicit masks
for all analyses using labeled probabilistic maps from the
atlases provided by Eickhoff et al. (2005) and Holdstock,
Hocking, Notley, Devlin, and Price (2009), respectively.
A height threshold of p< .005 was adopted following pre-
vious studies (e.g., Diana et al., 2010) in conjunction with a
cluster threshold of p< .05 estimated for each ROI using a
Monte Carlo estimation procedure with 10,000 simula-
tions (alphasim, implemented in Analysis of Functional
NeuroImages toolkit, AFNI; National Institute of Mental
Health, Bethesda, MD).
RESULTS
Behavioral Analyses
Overall, the participants demonstrated excellent recogni-
tionmemory performance (“certainly old”mean hit rate =
0.75; “probably old” mean hit rate = 0.11), with hit rates
approaching ceiling in the focused attention condition
following four item presentations. The mean false alarm
rate was 0.16. We fit both UVSD (see Dunn, 2004) and
DPSD (Yonelinas, 1994) models to each participantʼs full
set of responses (across four response categories) sepa-
rately using maximum likelihood estimation to estimate
contributions of either single strength-of-evidence dimen-
sion or familiarity and threshold-like recollection processes
in the different conditions (see Figure 1). One participantʼs
data were unable to fit with any model because of an insuf-
ficient number of “probable” responses, whereas another
was excluded because of issues with their imaging data
(see next section). Hence, the analyses presented here
are from the 14 remaining participants. A repeated mea-
sures ANOVA on the memory sensitivity (da)
2 values de-
rived from the UVSD model using both study condition
and item presentations as within subject variables revealed
main effects of both Attention, F(1, 15) = 7.87,MSE= 2.42,
p < .05, and Presentations, F(1, 14) = 8.46, MSE = 2.28,
p < .005. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 14) =
2.19, MSE = 1.82, p > .05. Inspection of Figure 1A shows
that the da values increase as the number of study presen-
tations increases in each attention condition, being higher
in the focused attention condition overall. A similar ANOVA
on the variance parameter estimates (s) failed to reveal main
effects of Attention, F(1, 15) = 0.04,MSE=1.19, p> .05, or
Presentations, F(1, 14) = 1.01, MSE = 1.56, p > .05,
although the interaction was significant, F(1, 14) = 5.29,
MSE = 0.76, p < .05 (Figure 1C).
We conducted a similar ANOVA on the DPSD model es-
timates of recollection (Figure 1E). This likewise revealed
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Figure 1. Plots showing UVSD
and DPSD model fits to the
behavioral data. (A) UVSD
sensitivity estimates (da) as a
function of study condition
(focused/divided attention and
number of study presentations).
(B) Differences between
UVSD sensitivity estimates for
focused and divided attention
conditions as a function of
study presentations. (C) UVSD
variance estimates (s) as a
function of study condition
(focused/divided attention and
number of study presentations).
(D) Differences between
UVSD variance estimates for
focused and divided attention
conditions as a function of
study presentations. (E) DPSD
recollection estimates as a
function of study condition
(focused/divided attention and
number of study presentations).
(F) Differences in DPSD
recollection estimates between
focused and divided attention
conditions as a function of
study presentations. (G) DPSD
familiarity estimates as a
function of study condition
(focused/divided attention and
number of study presentations).
(H) Differences in DPSD
familiarity estimates between
focused and divided attention
conditions as a function of
study presentations.
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main effects of both Attention, F(1, 15) = 6.42,MSE= 0.05,
p< .05, and Presentations, F(1, 14) = 35.97,MSE=0.01, p<
.001. The interaction was again not significant, F(1, 14) =
0.86, MSE = 0.02, p > .05. Inspection of Figure 1E shows
that the estimates of recollection in each attention con-
dition increase as the number of study presentations in-
creases, with recollection being higher in the focused
attention condition overall. This is consistent with pre-
vious behavioral data on item repetition and recollec-
tion estimates (see Yonelinas, 2002). However, it is not
predicted by more recent dual-process cognitive neuro-
science proposals distinguishing between perirhinal cortex
(familiarity) and hippocampus (recollection) responses, in
which the latter are considered relatively insensitive to
item repetition (e.g., Eichenbaum et al., 2007). An ANOVA
on the DPSD model estimates of familiarity revealed a main
effect of Attention, F(1, 15) = 10.23, MSE = 0.14, p < .01,
although not of Presentations, F(1, 14) = 1.68, MSE =
0.21, p > .05. The interaction was significant, F(1, 14) =
8.88, MSE = 0.13, p < .005 (Figure 1G). Again, this pattern
is not predicted by more recent dual-process cognitive neu-
roscience proposals in which perirhinal cortex (familiarity)
responses are considered more sensitive to item repetition
(e.g., Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Brown & Aggleton, 2001).
Although both the UVSD sensitivity and theDPSDmodel
recollection estimates showed a similar pattern of increas-
ing across conditions and presentations, analyses of the
differences between the respective model estimates for
focused and divided attention conditions revealed a quite
different pattern of results (Figure 1). This was accom-
plished for each model via the regression analysis for re-
peated measures data recommended by Lorch and Myers
(1990, Method 3, p. 153).3 A linear regression analysis
was computed for each individual participantʼs model es-
timate difference, with number of study presentations as
predictor variable. In a final step, a t test was performed
to test whether the regression weights of the group dif-
fered significantly from zero. For the UVSDmodel sensitivity
difference estimates, the strength coefficient approached
significance, t(13) = 2.01, SE = 0.23, p = .065, with the
difference in memory sensitivity between focused and
divided attention conditions showing a numerical increase
across study presentations (Figure 1B). A significant linear
effect was found for the difference in variance parameter
estimates, t(13) = 2.78, SE= 0.17, p< .05 (Figure 1D). By
contrast, the difference in recollection estimates between
attention conditions remained relatively stable across study
presentations according to the DPSDmodel, t(13) = 0.63,
SE = 0.02, p = .54 (Figure 1F), whereas the difference in
familiarity estimates between attention conditions showed
a significant linear reduction, t(13) = −3.36, SE = 0.08,
p < .01 (Figure 1H).
fMRI Analyses: Study Phase
The imaging data from one participant were excluded be-
cause of problems encountered during the T1 image seg-
mentation step. Analyses were thus conducted on the data
from the remaining 15 participants and were designed to
compare fMRI signals correlated with subjective estimates
of memory strength derived from the confidence ratings
and the more objective UVSD and DPSDmodel estimates.
We first conducted an analysis on only the high confi-
dence (“certainly old”) old responses, contrasting them
with responses to studied items that were not recognized
(i.e., misses) in each condition (focused versus divided
attention). This “subsequent memory” analysis is analo-
gous to those performed to identify recollection-related
activity in previous studies of focused and divided atten-
tion conducted from a DPSD perspective (e.g., Uncapher
& Rugg, 2008). As the analysis is restricted to high confi-
dence responses, it does not include a memory strength
confoundwhen comparing attention conditions proposed
to differ in terms of recollection (cf. Wais et al., 2010). An
ANOVA revealed significant activity in both left posterior
and right middle hippocampus (peak −22, −22, −18, Z =
4.40, 278 voxels; peak 24,−10,−20, Z= 4.40, 203 voxels,
respectively) and right perirhinal cortex (peak 30, 8,−22,
Z= 3.23, 42 voxels). Of note, all three peaks evidenced an
increase in activity in the focused condition and a reduc-
tion in the divided attention condition (see Figure 2A–C).
No significant activity was observed in perirhinal cortex in
the left hemisphere.
We next measured subsequent memory strength activ-
ity by directly contrasting correct old responses (hits) in
focused versus divided attention conditions at study at
each level of presentation (i.e., once, twice, or four times).
According to the UVSD model sensitivity estimates, this
analysis should reveal a pattern of increasing responses
(Figure 1B). According to theDPSDmodel recollection es-
timates (Figure 1F), the analysis should reveal little or no
difference across study presentations in hippocampal ac-
tivity. The DPSD model familiarity estimates (Figure 1H)
additionally predict a linear decrease in responses selec-
tively in the perirhinal cortex. An ANOVA revealed signifi-
cant activity in the leftmiddle hippocampus, corresponding
to the main effect of study presentations (peak voxel−22,
−26, −20, Z = 3.36, 39 voxels; see Figure 2D). No signifi-
cant activity was observed in the right hippocampus or in
the perirhinal cortex in either hemisphere.
As the ANOVAmakes no assumption about the shape of
response across item presentations and may be significant
if only one of the means of the item presentation condi-
tions is different from the others, we therefore regressed
the left middle hippocampal memory activity on the num-
ber of study presentations and tested the reliability of the
response. This was accomplished via the regression analy-
sis for repeated measures data recommended by Lorch
and Myers (1990, Method 3, p. 153). This involved first ex-
tracting, for all participants, the beta values for focused
versus divided attention contrasts at each study presenta-
tion from the peak voxel identified earlier. In a second
step, a linear regression analysis was computed for each
individual participant with number of study presentations
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as predictor variable. In a final step, a t test was performed
to test whether the regression weights of the group dif-
fered significantly from zero. A significant positive linear
relationship can be observed in Figure 2C, t(14) = 2.84,
SE = 1.52, p < .05.
fMRI Analyses: Recognition Phase
For the test phase data, we again conducted separate anal-
yses for the subjective confidence- versus model-based
contrasts. The first analysis was conducted on the correct
“certainly old” responses across study presentations, con-
trasting high confidence activity (or recollection) in fo-
cussed and divided attention conditions at test with
activity associated with misses (e.g., Uncapher & Rugg,
2008). An ANOVA failed to detect any significant activity
in either the hippocampal or the perirhinal cortex ROIs
across hemispheres. We next examined the pattern of ac-
tivity separately for each condition directly using t contrasts.
The right posterior hippocampus showed significantly
greater activity for high confidence items studied under
divided attention compared with missed items (peak 14,
−34, 0, Z = 3.87, 41 voxels), whereas high confidence
items studied with focused attention compared with missed
items showed a nonsignificant trend toward greater activ-
ity in the identical peak (Z=3.13, 11 voxels, p> .05 cluster
thresholded) (see Figure 3A). No significant activity was
observed in the left hippocampus or in the perirhinal cor-
tex in either hemisphere for each contrast.
The above analyses using subjective confidence as a
measure of recollection or memory strength indicate that
hippocampal activity was relatively insensitive to the
manipulation of attention. We next examined patterns of
activity by again contrasting focused versus divided at-
tention conditions using all items/trials with correct old
responses (hits) at each presentation. As per the study
phase data, the UVSD model sensitivity estimates predict
a pattern of increasing responses (Figure 1B). However,
the DPSD model recollection estimates (Figure 1F) pre-
dict little or no difference across study presentations in
hippocampal activity, and a pattern of decreasing responses
in the perirhinal cortex associated with the familiarity esti-
mates (Figure 1H). An ANOVA revealed significant activity
in the left posterior hippocampus (peak voxel −22, −34,
−10, Z=3.26, 44 voxels) and perirhinal cortex ROIs (peak
voxel−38,−12,−28, Z= 3.33, 41 voxels), corresponding
to the main effect of study Presentations (see Figure 3).
No significant activity was observed in the right hemi-
sphere in either ROI.
Next, we performed regression analyses for repeated
measures data for the identified left hippocampal and peri-
rhinal memory strength responses per the method ap-
plied for the study phase data discussed in the previous
paragraph (Lorch & Myers, 1990). For the left hippocam-
pal response, a significant positive linear relationship can
be seen in Figure 3B, t(14) = 3.72, SE = 4.29, p < .005. A
significant positive linear relationship can also be observed
in the left perirhinal cortex, t(14) = 3.54, SE = 3.18, p <
.005 (Figure 3C).
Finally, we compared the coefficients and slopes of the
hippocampal and perirhinal memory strength responses
to determine whether they differed significantly. The
two coefficients did not differ significantly according to
Steigerʼs Z test for correlated coefficients, Z = 0.45, p >
.05 (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992), indicating both re-
gions accounted for a similar amount of variance in terms
Figure 2. BOLD signal responses at study derived from confidence- and model-based analyses. Significant peak activation is shown at top
superimposed on a coronal slice from the group average T1-weighted image in MNI atlas space, with accompanying beta values. Error bars represent
SEM. (A) Significant activation in the left posterior hippocampus for the contrast of high confidence hits versus misses. (B) Significant activation
in the right posterior hippocampus for the contrast of high confidence hits versus misses. (C) Significant activation in the right perirhinal cortex
for the contrast of high confidence hits versus misses. (D) Significant activation in the left middle hippocampus for the model-based contrast
of focused and divided attention conditions across levels of item presentation.
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of memory strength responses. Similarly, a t test compar-
ing the two slopes indicated they did not differ signifi-
cantly (t = 1.39, p > .05).
DISCUSSION
The present experiment investigated whether hippocam-
pal and perirhinal cortex recognitionmemory fMRI signals
associated with subjective confidence ratings differ from
those related to UVSD andDPSDmodel estimates. Wema-
nipulated memory strength directly in a word recognition
task by incrementing item presentations across focused
and divided attention conditions at study, finding qualita-
tively different patterns of activity in the hippocampus
both at study and at test for the two analysis types. A similar
relationship with memory strength was observed for the
perirhinal cortex, although only at test. Overall, our results
are consistent with predictions from single-process UVSD
recognition memory models and indicate that recognition
memory fMRI measures derived from confidence ratings,
while correlated with memory strength, are also likely to
reflect unwanted item or decision-related confounds.
Consistent with prior behavioral research, the effect of
focussing attention on repeated spaced items at study was
to increase recognition memory performance across pre-
sentations (e.g., Guez & Naveh-Benjamin, 2006; Johnston
& Uhl, 1976; Homa & Fish, 1975). Both the UVSD and the
DPSD model estimates of sensitivity and recollection re-
spectively showed enhanced effects of focussing attention
and repeating items at study, confirming the experimental
manipulation of memory strength. The relatively stronger
effect of repeating items on the DPSDmodelʼs estimate of
recollection compared with familiarity is also consistent
with prior work (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002). However, the esti-
mates from the two models diverged when focused and
divided attention conditions were contrasted directly, with
the UVSD modelʼs strength estimate increasing across
study presentations, whereas the DPSD modelʼs recollec-
tion estimate remained relatively stable and its familiarity
estimate decreased. We therefore used these opposing es-
timates to inform our fMRI analyses. Other recent studies
have similarly used the DPSD model to inform their fMRI
analyses, although it did not derive estimates from the
UVSD model for comparison (e.g., Diana et al., 2010).
At both study and test, the hippocampus showed dif-
ferent (i.e., spatially distributed) responses according to
whether signals were associated with subjective confi-
dence or contrasts informed by UVSD and DPSD model
estimates. At study, the posterior hippocampus showed
activity bilaterally when high confidence responses were
contrasted with misses between focused and divided at-
tention conditions, consistent with the findings of a recent
fMRI study that used a similar subjective response-based
contrast (Uncapher & Rugg, 2008). Of note, activity across
hemispheres was increased in the focused condition and
reduced in the divided attention condition. At test, the
right posterior hippocampus also showed activity asso-
ciated with high confidence responses relative to misses,
although this did not differ between attention conditions.
This latter result contrasts with the significant main effect
Figure 3. BOLD signal responses at test derived from confidence- and model-based analyses. Significant peak activation is shown at top
superimposed on a coronal slice from the group average T1-weighted image in MNI atlas space, with accompanying beta values. Error bars represent
SEM. (A) Activation in the right posterior hippocampus for the contrast of high confidence hits versus misses in both conditions. (B) Significant
activation in the left posterior hippocampus for the model-based contrast of focused and divided attention conditions across levels of item
presentation. (C) Significant activation in the left perirhinal cortex for the model-based contrast of focused and divided attention conditions across
levels of item presentation.
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of attention shown by the DPSD model recollection esti-
mates and might indicate that fMRI measures of recollec-
tion on the basis of confidence ratings are not necessarily
equivalent tomodel estimates. Moreover, it might indicate
that activity associated with confidence ratings at study is
not necessarily related to that observed at test, an issue not
considered by previous studies (e.g., Uncapher & Rugg,
2008). Alternatively, the result may be considered consis-
tent with that of Wais et al. (2010), who recently failed to
find differential hippocampal activity for a contrast of high
confidence responses with correct and incorrect source at-
tributions, interpreted as supporting a memory strength
account. According to the DPSD approach, contrasts of
focused versus divided attention and correct versus incor-
rect source attribution conditions should be analogous in
terms of identifying recollection (e.g., Eichenbaum et al.,
2007; Yonelinas, 2002).
Conversely, the analysis informed by the model esti-
mates demonstrated BOLD signal differences between
conditions increased across item presentations at both
study and test in the middle and posterior hippocampus,
respectively, and solely in the left hemisphere. This find-
ing, predicted by the UVSD model, is consistent with the
operation of a total strength-of-evidence variable (e.g.,
Wixted, 2007; Dunn, 2004) and is contrary to the DPSD
model prediction of a relatively stable response for recol-
lection across item presentations. However, as the DPSD
model recollection estimate essentially predicted a null ef-
fect, we cannot exclude the possibility that the lack of sig-
nificant activity observed in adjacent hippocampal voxels
in fact reflects the operation of recollection. For the same
reason, we cannot exclude the possibility that the lack of
significant activity observed in adjacent perirhinal cortex
voxels (see succeeding paragraphs) likewise reflects the
operation of recollection, although the DPSD account
views the latter regions as being selectively associated with
familiarity (e.g., Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Brown & Aggleton,
2001). Nevertheless, the fact that the confidence- and
model-based analyses produced different hippocampal
peak responses both within and across hemispheres in-
dicates that the two approaches to measuring memory
strength are not equivalent. We propose that this lack of
equivalence likely reflects the item and decision process
confounds that we highlighted in the Introduction.
We were unable to detect any fMRI responses in the
perirhinal cortex at study that had a significant relationship
with either model-based analysis, although the confidence-
based analysis did show significant activity in the right hemi-
sphere between attention conditions. Several fMRI studies
using confidence ratings have reported perirhinal cortex
activation during study related to successful item recogni-
tion in the context of item versus source/associate recog-
nitionmemory tasks, and this has been proposed to reflect
processes that might contribute to later recollection, such
as binding of related item features (e.g., item-color associa-
tions; Staresina &Davachi, 2008; Ranganath et al., 2003) or
source information encoded as an item detail (Diana et al.,
2010). Hence, this result might be considered consistent
with the DPSD model view, as contrasts of focused versus
divided attention and correct versus incorrect source attri-
bution conditions should produce similar results in terms
of recollection (e.g., Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Yonelinas,
2002). In the model-based analyses, the DPSD model esti-
mate of familiarity predicted a reduced response across
item presentations between attention conditions, whereas
the UVSDmodel estimate predicted the opposite relation-
ship. Neither pattern was found in perirhinal cortex at
study. Similarly, investigations of itemmemory comparing
conditions varying in strength have typically not reported
perirhinal cortex activity at study for successful word rec-
ognition, although have reported hippocampal activation
(e.g., low- vs. high-frequency words, de Zubicaray et al.,
2005a; easy versus hard divided attention, Uncapher &
Rugg, 2005; Kensinger et al., 2003).
The absence of perirhinal cortex activity associated with
high confidence responses at test is consistent with pre-
vious work conducted from the DPSD perspective (e.g.,
Yonelinas et al., 2005) and indicates that confidence-
related perirhinal cortex activity observed at study does
not necessarily entail retrieval-related activity in the same
region. However, perirhinal cortex did demonstrate a pat-
tern of increasing activity between conditions and across
presentations at test in relation to the model-based con-
trasts. This was consistent with the UVSD model predic-
tion and inconsistent with the DPSD modelʼs familiarity
estimate prediction of reduced activity. However, on the
basis of statistical comparisons of the coefficients and
slopes for the hippocampus and perirhinal cortex activity,
our results indicate that the twoMTL regions show equiva-
lent strength responses, arguing against an anatomical di-
vision of labor in terms of different types of information
processing. They also do not support an interpretation
that hippocampal activity can be considered the primary
determinant of memory strength (cf. Wixted, 2007).
The finding of equivalentmemory strength responses in
hippocampal and perirhinal cortex, although able to be
interpreted as consistent with the dual-process UVSD ap-
proach, nevertheless contrasts it with the simpler single-
process account. The dual-process UVSD account proposes
that continuously distributed recollection and familiarity
processes can be combined into a single, unidimensional
memory strength variable (e.g., Wixted, 2007), whereas
the single-process UVSD account simply proposes a total
strength-of-evidence dimension. If the hippocampus and
the perirhinal cortex demonstrate equivalent memory
strength responses in terms of slope (cf. Squire et al.,
2007), as is the case in the present study, then the value
of proposing qualitatively different recollection and famil-
iarity processes seems limited. The single-process UVSD
approach does not make this additional assumption.
Another possible interpretation of our results is that the
higher overall hit rates in the focused attention condi-
tion might be responsible for the BOLD signal differences
observed at each level of item/memory strength. This
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seems unlikely because the difference in hit rates be-
tween focused and divided attention conditions actually
decreased as item presentations increased, the opposite
of the relationship observed. To address this possibility,
we equated the hit rates for focused and divided con-
ditions at each level of item presentation within partici-
pants in a post hoc analysis. The beta values extracted
from the peak voxels in the hippocampus and perirhinal
cortex again showed equivalent increasing responses
in relation to the UVSD model estimates at both study
and test.
Summary
The present fMRI study contrasted patterns of fMRI activ-
ity in the hippocampus and perirhinal cortex associated
with subjective confidence ratings and contrasts informed
by UVSD and DPSD model estimates at both study and
test. The two types of analysis produced qualitatively dif-
ferent patterns of activity. Critically, the model-based anal-
ysis did not reflect sources of variability associated with
item confounds or intra- and interindividual differences
in separating weak from strongmemories. This analysis re-
vealed increasing responses in the hippocampus at both
study and test and at test in the perirhinal cortex. Although
consistent overall with a single-process model account,
the results may be interpreted as providing only partial
support for the DPSD model view or for an account that
considers hippocampal activity to be the primary measure
of memory strength. The nature of the relationship(s) be-
tween fMRImeasures of MTL activity andmemory strength
requires further investigation, and this may be furthered
by explicitly contrasting predictions derived from UVSD
and DPSD models.
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Notes
1. Similarly, the flatter and more linear ROC curves obtained
from source or associative memory tasks appear to be an artifact
of variability and averaging across different levels of subjective
memory strength rather than indicating these tasks are more
dependent on recollection (Hautus, Macmillan, & Rotello, 2008;
cf. Eichenbaum et al., 2007).
2. The da sensitivity measure from the UVSD model differs
from the conventional d 0 measure by permitting the variances
of the old and newdistributions to differ (Macmillan&Creelman,
2005). The values can be interpreted similarly.
3. The critical distinction between Method 3 and the other two
methods proposed by Lorch andMyers (1990) is that it computes
the Subject × Linear term, with Mean Square (Subject × Linear)
used as the error term to test Mean Square ( linear), which is ap-
propriate for our data.
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